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Using new quarterly U.S. data for the past 120 years, I show that sudden reversals
in equity and credit market sentiment approximated by several measures of corporate
securities issuance are highly predictive of banking crises and recessions. Deviations in
equity issuance from historical averages also help to explain economic activity over the
business cycle. Crises and recessions often occur independently of domestic leverage,
making the credit-to-GDP gap a deficient early-warning indicator historically. The fact
that equity issuance reversals predict banking crises without elevated private credit
levels, suggests that changes in investor sentiment can trigger financial crises even in
the absence of underlying banking fragility.
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I. Introduction
Banking crises tend to occur after credit booms go bust (Schularick & Taylor, 2012). The
business cycle, too, is fundamentally at the mercy of the ebb and flow of private credit
(Gilchrist & Zakraǰsek, 2012). What, however, drives these credit booms? Several well-
known propositions have been made including technological shocks (Minsky’s (1986) dis-
placement), credit supply shocks (Mian et al., 2017), financial deregulation (Favara & Imbs,
2015), “irrational exuberance” (Shiller, 2016), or “new era” thinking (Reinhart & Rogoff,
2009). Many of these propositions involve—implicitly or explicitly—a radical shift in agents’
expectations about future income and profit opportunities towards the better. As the be-
havioral finance literature shows, this shift in sentiment can be so forceful that it pushes
investors’ expectations beyond numbers that can be justified by fundamentals. In this case,
the result is an upward spiral of increased borrowing and booming asset prices feeding off
each other through rising collateral values. Whether we look at economic activity or financial
fragility, investors sentiment plays a pivotal role. It is thus all the more surprising that while
a substantial number of empirical studies have looked into the role of market sentiment for
economic activity (Greenwood & Hanson, 2013; López-Salido et al., 2017; Milani, 2017), its
impact on financial fragility, and the assessment of its predictive power for banking crises,
has largely been neglected. This study seeks to fill this void.
I present new quarterly data spanning 120 years of securities issuance in the United
States as a proxy for investor sentiment in corporate debt and equity markets to assess its
usefulness in explaining economic activity and financial fragility. Specifically, I investigate
how sudden shifts in sentiment can be used for the prediction of banking crises and reces-
sions ahead of time. Previous assessments of this question were constrained by historical
data availability only at annual frequency (Philippon, 2015; López-Salido et al., 2017; Krish-
namurthy & Muir, 2017) or by small sample sizes due to the availability of higher frequency
data only well after World War II (Gilchrist & Zakraǰsek, 2012; Mian et al., 2017).
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Assuming “limits to arbitrage” (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997), I approximate investor sen-
timent with issuance activity in corporate debt and equity markets and find that sudden
reversals in market sentiment are highly predictive of impending banking crises over an av-
erage time horizon of six months and of future recessions up to two years ahead of time.
Issuance activity outperforms the private credit-to-GDP gap in its capacity to predict bank-
ing fragility in and out of sample. Deviations in equity issuance from historical averages also
help to explain economic activity over the business cycle. Crises and recessions often occur
independently of domestic leverage, making the credit-to-GDP gap a deficient early-warning
indicator in historical application. The fact that equity issuance reversals predict banking
crises without elevated private credit levels, suggests that changes in investor sentiment can
trigger financial crises even in the absence of underlying banking fragility. A recently pro-
posed triggers-plus-vulnerabilities interpretation of the credit cycle by López-Salido et al.
(2017) seems less likely to hold in light of my findings, as financial fragility measures based
on credit aggregates perform poorly in predicting the economy’s susceptibility to shocks,
putting a much stronger focus on the strength of triggers than on the vulnerabilities induced
by private sector leverage. Novel quarterly data on bank lending further supports the in-
terpretation that not the built-up of private credit is responsible for financial fragility and
bank distress, but its sudden retraction.
The remainder of this paper is structure as follows. Section II briefly reviews the lit-
erature on market sentiment, presents the data, and explains how I approximate sentiment
through several different measures of corporate securities issuance. Section III discusses the
relationship between financial fragility and the credit cycle, computes a historically con-
sistent credit-to-GDP gap, and predicts banking crises using the data and methodology
introduced before. Section IV applies my market sentiment proxies to the business cycle and
assesses their ability to predict recessions. The conclusion in section V summarizes the main
contributions, discusses avenues for further research, and outlines policy advice.
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II. Market Sentiment and securities issuance
Recently, several studies have revisited the impact of credit and equity market sentiment on
macroeconomic performance from empirical (Baker & Wurgler, 2007; Greenwood & Hanson,
2013; López-Salido et al., 2017) and theoretical viewpoints (Shleifer & Vishny, 2010; Green-
wood et al., 2016; Bordalo et al., 2018). While the ability of the Treasury yield curve—i.e.
the 10-year-to-3-months term spread in U.S. government bonds—to predict recessions ahead
of time is well-known (Estrella & Mishkin, 1998), this study looks at issuance activity in
corporate securities markets—i.e. corporate bonds and stocks—to proxy investor sentiment
and explain macroeconomic performance. In particular, I explore the informational content
of several measures of gross equity and debt issuance to forecast future stock returns and
the future term spread, respectively, as proxies for investors’ sentiment in equity and credit
markets and their ability to predict banking crises, economic growth, and recessions.
In their seminal study on sentiment in the stock market, Baker & Wurgler (2007) define
”investor sentiment, [...] broadly, [...as] a belief about future cash flows and investment risks
that is not justified by the facts at hand” (p. 129), and lay out two now well-established
assumptions of the behavioral finance literature: First, market participants are subject to
sentiment (De Long et al., 1990); and second, betting against sentiment—i.e. forcing asset
prices back to their fair values justified by fundamentals—is costly and risky, inducing “limits
to arbitrage” (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Managers of corporations may exploit this deviation
from rationality by issuing stocks when prices are high relative to fundamentals due to
buoyant sentiment and by repurchasing stocks when prices are low. On a market-wide scale
this means that sentiment can be well proxied by the variation in aggregate stock issuance.
In the following, I adopt this line of reasoning and extend it to the market of corporate
debt securities, as well, assuming that corporations issue new debt when prices are high—




This study follows large parts of the literature in assuming that corporate securities issuance
activity is a suitable proxy for market sentiment. This assumptions has widely been accepted
for both stock (Baker & Wurgler, 2000) and bond markets (Greenwood & Hanson, 2013),
and has been used successfully to predict economic activity (López-Salido et al., 2017) and
recessions (Estrella & Mishkin, 1998).1 The link between corporate securities issuance and
banking crises, however, has largely been neglected. This study seeks to step into this breach.
The intuition behind using corporate securities issuance to proxy investor sentiment when
assessing financial fragility is that, first, elevated issuance activity soaks up liquidity that
will be unavailable to market participants in case cash flows fall short, thereby increasing
the risk of bankruptcies, and second, that it allows economic agents to over-extend their
funding beyond what would be attainable in a more sober market environment. These
excess means will then engage in investment as well as in speculation, driving sentiment
up even higher, reinforcing the destabilizing mechanism. A more encompassing review of
the theoretical literature on the link between sentiment and banking crises and economic
activity, respectively, is discussed at the end of this section. First, I introduce my issuance
measures and explain the methodology for approximating sentiment using these measures.
To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first to present quarterly data on debt and
equity issuance in the United States for the past 120 years. An influential study by Baker
& Wurgler (2000), which argues that high ratios of equity-to-debt issuance—interpreted as
a sentiment proxy—predict low stock market returns, uses annual data beginning in 1927
only. Based on my data, I present three variables which I use to compute my sentiment
proxies for credit and equity markets:2
1 Derrien & Kecskés (2009) cautions against the use of equity issuance as a proxy for invest sentiment
and argues that, when controlled for accurately measured fundamentals, the effect of investor sentiment
on the issuance of corporate stocks is relatively small. Their findings, however, are based on firm-level
regressions, and the authors do not control for times of elevated aggregate sentiment that may temporarily
overrule the otherwise fundamentals-based valuation of corporate equity.
2 In Figure A.9 in the appendix, I discuss a fourth measure of issuance activity: the equity issuance-to-price
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Issuance-to-GDP ratio =











High yield share =





where equity issuance E refers to the gross amount of corporate stocks issued within one
quarter and debt issuance D is the gross amount of corporate bonds issued over the same
period. HY is the gross issuance volume of high yield bonds. GDP is the nominal gross
domestic product at the end of the respective quarter. When gross issuance is negative for
equities in the source data (only buybacks) the number is set to zero. All figures are in
million U.S. Dollars and in current prices. The construction of the figures and their sources
are explained in detail in Table A.7 in the appendix. Figure 1 plots data for companies’
gross equity and debt issuance relative to GDP with periods of banking crisis shaded in grey,
while Figure 2 displays the equity and high yield share.
As can be seen from Figure 1, total securities issuance in relation to GDP acceler-
ates before periods of banking crises and drops sharply very shortly—i.e. one to several
quarters—before the onset of the crises. I employ data and narrative evidence from Baron
& Dieckelmann (2021) to determine the beginning and end of banking crisis periods in the
United States. A beginning is dated to the quarter of a panic event, such as bank runs
or large failures, at which the banking crisis becomes systemic: The drop in copper prices
that triggered bank runs and the failure of Knickerbocker Trust in October 1907, the Great
Depression’s first wave of bank failures in October 1930, the run on Continental Illinois
National Bank in May 1984, and the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. In
comparison to its historical average, the issuance of corporate debt securities explodes in the
mid-1980s: a trend that arguably can be attributed to the deregulation at the time. Except
ratio. This measure is highly illustrative of the ability of issuance activity to predict banking crises but
does not add informational content to the three measures and their respective application in computing
the sentiment proxies. I discuss the reason for the measure’s exclusion in more detail in the appendix.
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1900q1 1920q1 1940q1 1960q1 1980q1 2000q1 2020q1
Banking crisis Equity issuance Debt Issuance Total issuance
Notes: The lines represent annualized four-quarter averages of gross corporate securities issuance
in relation to nominal GDP. Shaded areas in grey represent periods of banking crises according to
Baron & Dieckelmann (2021).
for the years preceding the Great Depression, equity issuance remains largely constant in
relation to the size of the economy albeit exhibiting oscillating behavior (Covas & Den Haan,
2011; Baron, 2020). Equity and debt issuance flattens out almost entirely in the aftermath
of the Great Depression.
In Figure 2 we observe that the equity share has a tendency to shoot up before periods
of bank distress within a range of several years to a few quarters prior. The picture for
the high yield share looks somewhat different: An increase in the relative issuance of high
yield bonds followed by a subsequent reversal tend to precede banking crises. The timing,
however, is much less precise than with the equity share or the total issuance-to-GDP ratio,
and thus maybe hold less predictive power. Parallel to the volume of debt issuance, in the
1980s, a structural break occurs after which the high yield share seems to follow a cyclical
pattern closely related to the business cycle and mirrored in the findings of Greenwood &
Hanson (2013), who show that the credit quality of corporate debt issuers deteriorates—
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1900q1 1920q1 1940q1 1960q1 1980q1 2000q1 2020q1
Banking crisis Equity share High yield share High yield share (smoothed)
Notes: Equity share refers to the ratio of the volumes of issued shares over corporate bonds per
quarter. High yield share refers to ratio of bonds categorized as high yield by rating agencies over
the total volume of corporate bonds issued. Data from 1980 is quarterly and presented as a four-
quarter moving average, whereas previous data is annual. A centered four-quarter moving average
is used to smooth the full series. Shaded areas in grey represent periods of banking crises according
to Baron & Dieckelmann (2021).
i.e. the high yield share increases—during credit booms, pointing towards overheating as a
recurring feature of the credit cycle. The sharp uptake of the high yield share and equity
share in the wake of the Great Depression should be interpreted with great caution, as they
coincide with virtually no issuance of new corporate securities in absolute terms, as shown
above.
The stylized facts presented here motivate my investigation of the usefulness of corporate
securities as proxies for investor sentiment and as early-warning indicators of banking sector
distress. Methodologically, I follow the approach of López-Salido et al. (2017) and use a two-
step regression to compute forecasts of future credit spreads and equity returns, respectively,
as proxies of sentiment. First, I regress credit spreads or equity returns on their lagged values
and on a combination of the corporate securities issuance measures presented above. Then,
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in the following sections, I use the fitted values—alongside credit aggregate measures—
to explain and predict the incidence of recessions and banking crises. For out-of-sample
predictions, I estimate the first-step regression on a recursive basis, ensuring that fitted values
only incorporate information that was available at the time of the fitted value. Following
Greenwood & Hanson (2013) and López-Salido et al. (2017), I interpret the fitted values of
the first-step regression as fluctuations in investor sentiment in corporate debt and equity
markets.
Now, why exactly do I believe that this methodology captures market sentiment? I
follow López-Salido et al.’s (2017) line of argument and hypothesize that when expected
(i.e. forecasted) returns of corporate bonds are unusually low—or in the case of equity
returns, unusually high—in comparison to historical averages, then this is a sign of elevated
sentiment. Following the assumption that there are “limits to arbitrage”, these buoyant
expectations then would be reflected in elevated issuance activity as managers seek to profit
from the abnormally high prices that exalted investors are willing to pay. I, thus, regress
future returns on credit or equity on the indicators of issuance activity presented above and
on an auto-regressive factor. In the following, I discuss the estimations of the respective
market sentiment proxies in detail.
Stock market sentiment
To derive an indicator of investor sentiment in the stock market, I forecast future quarterly
stock returns re with lagged values of historical stock returns and of the issuance measures





, and, additionally, the interaction of the two former variables, the equity-issuance-
to-GDP ratio E
GDP
.3 I include the last four quarters as lagged values for each of these variables










4 I choose four lags as the result of a trade-off consideration between a sufficiently long horizon to observe
the unfolding of reversals in issuance activity and a sufficiently low number of coefficients to not over-
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inclusion of the total issuance activity is deliberate as I want to disentangle the predictive
effect of issuance in equity markets from aggregate investor sentiment. I estimate a simple
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model of the form























)t−i + ε (1)
where I interpret the estimated forecast of the future growth rate of the equity index as
equity sentiment se = r̂e. Table 1 displays the estimation results.
I generally find that the addition of corporate securities issuance measures improves the
performance of an otherwise auto-regressive process with four lags (model one). Baker &
Wurgler’s (2000) finding that a higher equity share forecasts lower stock returns is confirmed
in models three, four, and six at high significance. Interestingly, the total issuance-to-GDP
ratio becomes a negative predictor of future stock returns even when I include the equity
issuance-to-GDP ratio in model six, increasing the adjusted R2 by 0.017. This lets me
conclude that aggregate sentiment adds to the predictability of future stock returns on top
of sentiment in the equity market. In summary, the sum of the lagged coefficients of each
variable tend to be negative, indicating that elevated issuance activity and a higher equity
share, representing buoyant sentiment, are typically followed by lower future stock returns.
Relying on a large literature that has established that stock returns predict investment
(Morck et al., 1990), I conclude that periods of buoyant sentiment and above-average issuance
activity are followed by lower stock returns, and thus, in response, by lower investment,
inducing a decline in economic activity. Further, the fact that a higher equity share is
predictive of lower stock returns can be interpreted such that managers acting upon inside
knowledge make use of the still optimistic market environment to raise additional equity
in anticipation of an economic slowdown or a deterioration of their business activity in the
future. Markets will react to these developments with a lag, and when stock prices ultimately
identify the model. The choice of four lags is also informed by the inspection of the styled facts above,
showing that reversals in issuance activity tend to occur only shortly before periods of banking crises and
unravel over very short time spans of a few quarters.
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Table 1: Estimating the stock market sentiment proxy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
re re re re re re
L.re 0.025 0.022 0.000 −0.008 0.013 0.009
(0.046) (0.047) (0.046) (0.048) (0.047) (0.048)
L2.re 0.045 0.038 0.030 0.022 0.036 0.015
(0.046) (0.047) (0.046) (0.049) (0.048) (0.049)
L3.re 0.123∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗ 0.104∗∗ 0.092∗
(0.046) (0.047) (0.046) (0.049) (0.048) (0.049)
L4.re −0.115∗∗ −0.113∗∗ −0.100∗∗ −0.091∗ −0.093∗∗ −0.063
(0.046) (0.047) (0.046) (0.047) (0.046) (0.047)
L.(E+D)/GDP 0.023 −0.266 2.190
(1.202) (1.209) (1.605)
L2.(E+D)/GDP 0.896 0.766 −3.797∗∗
(1.361) (1.357) (1.903)
L3.(E+D)/GDP 0.275 0.020 2.859
(1.368) (1.369) (1.907)
L4.(E+D)/GDP −1.552 −1.654 −2.051
(1.197) (1.205) (1.598)
L.E/(E+D) −0.016 −0.026 0.073
(0.048) (0.049) (0.071)
L2.E/(E+D) −0.076 −0.070 −0.248∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.056) (0.078)
L3.E/(E+D) 0.020 0.014 0.130∗
(0.054) (0.055) (0.077)










Constant 0.012∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.008) (0.010) (0.014) (0.007) (0.017)
Observations 477 477 477 477 477 477
R2 0.030 0.035 0.061 0.074 0.068 0.098
Adjusted R2 0.022 0.019 0.045 0.050 0.052 0.067
Notes: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence level, respectively. (E+D)/GDP
symbolizes total issuance-to-GDP ratio, with E referring to equity issuance and D to debt issuance, respec-
tively. Consequently, E/(E+D) signifies the equity share. E/GDP is the equity issuance-to-debt ratio and
simultaneously the interaction term between the total issuance-to-GDP ratio and the equity share. L stands
for a one-quarter lag, while L followed by a number refers to a variable lagged by n quarters.




To derive a sentiment proxy for credit markets, I regress the absolute future difference in the
corporate term spread—defined as the difference between the yield of BAA-rated corporate
bonds with 10-year maturity and the yield of three-month commercial paper—between two
consecutive quarters ∆CTS on lagged values of the level of the term spread, of the total
issuance-to-GDP ratio E+D
GDP
, of the equity share E
E+D
, of the high yield share HY
D
, and of the
debt issuance-to-GDP ratio D
GDP
.5 For each variable I use four quarters of lagged values and
estimate a simple OLS regression model of the form






























where I interpret the estimated forecast of the future corporate term spread as credit sen-
timent sc = ̂∆CTS. I choose the corporate term spread over the credit spread because the
former is known to have better predictive capabilities in terms of economic activity (Stock
& Watson, 2003). The estimation results are displayed in Table 2.
I find that future changes in the term spread are well predicted by lagged values of the
term spread with a adjusted R2 of 0.154 in model one.6 The addition of the high yield or
equity share adds no or even slightly reduces predictive power, while the inclusion of total
issuance in model two increases the adjusted R2 by 0.012. While all four lagged values of
the term spread are significant, only the positive coefficient of the fourth lag of the total
issuance-to-GDP ratio is significant, as well. Aggregate issuance activity clearly forecasts
5 Note that the debt issuance-to-GDP ratio is the interaction term between the total-issuance-to-GDP ratio
and the equity share with an inverse sign.
6 While this number seems relatively small, it is well in line with similar results in (López-Salido et al.,
2017). Considering how many macroeconomic and global factors influence the U.S. term spread (for which
I do not control), the fact that I am able to explain around 16% of the variation in the future term spread
by autoregressive factors alone is actually quite astonishing.
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Table 2: Estimating the corporate credit market sentiment proxy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
∆CTS ∆CTS ∆CTS ∆CTS ∆CTS ∆CTS ∆CTS
L.CTS 0.195∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.047) (0.045) (0.046) (0.048)
L2.CTS −0.506∗∗∗ −0.485∗∗∗ −0.503∗∗∗ −0.495∗∗∗ −0.485∗∗∗ −0.490∗∗∗ −0.491∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.071) (0.069) (0.069) (0.072)
L3.CTS 0.490∗∗∗ 0.476∗∗∗ 0.506∗∗∗ 0.486∗∗∗ 0.492∗∗∗ 0.495∗∗∗ 0.489∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.068) (0.069) (0.071) (0.069) (0.069) (0.073)
L4.CTS −0.256∗∗∗ −0.256∗∗∗ −0.270∗∗∗ −0.261∗∗∗ −0.267∗∗∗ −0.269∗∗∗ −0.262∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.045) (0.046) (0.048) (0.046) (0.046) (0.050)
L.(E+D)/GDP −0.066 −0.078 −0.265 −0.234
(0.073) (0.074) (0.288) (0.302)
L2.(E+D)/GDP −0.086 −0.094 0.166 0.074
(0.085) (0.086) (0.312) (0.331)
L3.(E+D)/GDP −0.010 0.001 −0.258 −0.163
(0.085) (0.086) (0.312) (0.331)
L4.(E+D)/GDP 0.201∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗ 0.631∗∗ 0.649∗∗
(0.073) (0.074) (0.285) (0.300)
L.E/(E+D) −0.005 −0.005 −0.003 −0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
L2.E/(E+D) 0.001 −0.000 −0.003 −0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
L3.E/(E+D) 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
L4.E/(E+D) −0.000 0.000 −0.005 −0.004

















Constant 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.003∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 472 472 472 433 472 472 433
R2 0.161 0.180 0.166 0.170 0.186 0.193 0.200
Adjusted R2 0.154 0.166 0.152 0.154 0.165 0.164 0.161
Notes: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence level, respectively. ∆ is the
difference operator and CTS stands for the credit term spread. L symbolizes a one-quarter lag, while L
followed by a number refers to a variable lagged by n quarters.
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a positive change in the term spread, indicating that elevated market sentiment tends to
be followed by economic downturns, as rising spreads typically occur during or prior to
recessions. In contrast to Greenwood & Hanson (2013) who find that the high yield share is
a good proxy for credit sentiment which soars during credit booms, I find that the high yield
share performs poorly in my setting, adding virtually no predictive power in comparison to
the other issuance measures. I explain this with the fact that I investigate a much longer time
horizon and use data of higher frequency than Greenwood & Hanson (2013) which brings to
light that the predictive ability of a deterioration of issuer quality—i.e. a rising high yield
share—for future bond returns and for credit market overheating is a phenomenon that only
occurs since the 1980s. This is nicely visible from Figure 2 in the previous section.
Intuitively, the link between the term spread and market sentiment is captured by
the fact that decreasing term spreads represent a deterioration in investors’ perception of
interest rate risk. The lower the term spread, the more aggressively is long term credit
priced in comparison to short term credit of comparable issuer quality. The increasing price
of long term credit relative to short term credit—i.e. the relatively declining financing costs—
caused by investors’ overly optimistic risk perception is then exploited by managers through
increased corporate bond issuance. This is why, I assume that buoyant credit sentiment
can be approximated by elevated issuance activity. The results in Table 2 show that this
increased issuance activity will then lead to rising term spreads, lending itself well to Arif
& Lee’s (2014) finding that periods of over-investment caused by overly favorable market
conditions are typically followed by a slowdown in economic activity.
The adjusted R2 of the full model for forecasting term spreads is more than double than
that of the respective full model for the forecasts of stock returns in Table 1. However,
the inclusion of corporate securities issuance measures had a much bigger impact on predic-
tive ability in forecasting future stock returns than in predicting changes in the future term
spread, indicating that the approximation of sentiment through issuance activity might be
slightly more relevant for equity markets than for credit markets. Figure 3 shows the es-
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1900q1 1920q1 1940q1 1960q1 1980q1 2000q1 2020q1
Banking crisis Equity sentiment Credit sentiment
Notes: Sentiment proxies refer to in-sample predictions of future growth in stock prices or the
absolute future change in the corporate term spread, respectively. Positive values for the equity
sentiment proxy and negative values for the credit sentiment proxy, respectively, indicate buoyant
sentiment, while the reverse signals overly pessimistic sentiment. Shaded areas in grey represent
periods of banking crises according to Baron & Dieckelmann (2021).
timated forecasts on the basis of model six from Table 1 and of model six from Table 2,
respectively, which I interpret as proxies for market sentiment in equity and credit markets.7
Credit sentiment—proxied by the forecasted absolute change in the term spread—shows
a clear pattern of cyclicality. This stylized fact has recently received considerable attention
with studies investigating the role of sentiment in driving the business cycle and, more
7 I choose model six over model seven from Table 2 and, thus, exclude the high yield share from the ultimate
credit sentiment proxy estimation for several reasons. First, my high yield share data starts only in 1908
and the estimation would exclude the important panic of 1907. Second, the inclusion of the high yield
share actually decreases the adjusted R2 relative to model 6 and, thus, does not add predictive power to
the estimation. And third, I achieve consistency through the exclusion as both ultimate sentiment proxies
are estimated using the autoregressive factor, the total issuance-to-GDP ratio, the equity share, and the
(inverse) interaction of the latter two.
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concretely, focusing on the role of credit sentiment as a driver of a potential credit cycle at
business cycle wavelengths (e.g. López-Salido et al., 2017). Equity sentiment—proxied by the
forecasted percentage change in equity prices—deteriorates sharply shortly before episodes
of banking crises, while credit sentiment improves during banking crises but has a tendency
to collapse shortly before their outbreak. Note that, as the credit sentiment proxy captures
investors’ forecast of the future change in the term spread, a positive value is associated with
the expectation of widening spreads and, thus, with a shift towards pessimistic sentiment.
The reverse applies to the equity sentiment proxy where a positive value refers to the expec-
tation of positive future stock returns on the basis of issuance activity and, thus, indicates
buoyant sentiment. I interpret these pronounced swings before periods of bank distress as a
sign that the sharp reversal of sentiment has a triggering effect. Bordalo et al. (2018) come
to a similar conclusion and write “that crises occur when good news stops coming, so that
excess optimism reverts” (p. 223). Not all sharp reversals are followed by banking crises,
however. In section III, I investigate under which conditions these sudden shifts in sentiment
are followed by the outbreak of banking crises.
Theoretical background
In the following, I briefly discuss the link between market sentiment and banking crises and
economic activity, respectively. I begin with reviewing the literature on sentiment, banking
crises, and financial fragility, and its relation to the credit cycle. I then move on to theoretical
explanations of the relationship between sentiment and economic activity and recessions.
Theorists of banking crises have long stressed the importance of sentiment in their
formation: ”Animal spirits” (Keynes), ”irrational exuberance” (Greenspan, Shiller), and
”euphoria” (Minsky) all refer to buoyant collective emotional states during periods of per-
sistent deviation from asset price valuations and volumes of external finance justifiable by
fundamentals or desirable from the perspective of a social planner. Market participants buy
assets based on overly confident beliefs about future profits, while corporations leverage up
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by discounting over-optimistic forecasts of future cash flows. When the toxic combination of
rising asset prices and ballooning private debt reaches its apex, the ”Minsky moment” sets
in and euphoria turns into panic. The sharp reversal in sentiment triggers a cascade of fire
sales in a scramble for cash where not fundamentals or rational expectations of future profits
take the helm, but the sheer fear of ending up the hindmost who the devil takes.
Attempting to flesh out the narrative above, several studies have investigated the link
between sentiment and banking crises from a theoretical perspective. Shleifer & Vishny
(2010) propose a formal three-period model in which banks make, securitize, distribute, and
trade loans, and are influenced by investor sentiment. During good times—i.e. when prices
for securitized assets are high—banks extend their balance sheets and borrow short-term to
engage in the very profitable business of securitizing loans. This over-leveraging leaves them
with little means in bad times which increases the risk of them having to liquidate their
portfolios. Bank profits and real investments become highly cyclical and swings in investor
sentiment are transmitted through the banking system to the real economy. Greenwood
et al. (2016) present a model of credit market sentiment in which investors extrapolate past
defaults in the bond market. A feedback loop between sentiment and market outcomes arises
endogenously and several well-documented features of credit-driven boom-bust cycles can be
explained. Ultimately, elevated sentiment covers up the deterioration of fundamentals before
crises and, thus, artificially prolongs credit booms, creating an environment of “calm before
the storm” that is consistent with historical narratives. Bordalo et al. (2018) develop a
model of credit cycles in which expectations form by overweighting “future outcomes that
become more likely in light of new data” (p. 199) and credit spreads turn out to be overly
volatile and their reversals to be predictable. As a result, “crises occur when good news
stops coming, so that excess optimism [i.e. buoyant sentiment] reverts” (p. 223).
Empirically, market sentiment and banking crises have also received fresh attention
recently, using both narrative and quantitative approaches. Reinhart & Rogoff (2009) fa-
mously argue that banking crises tend to be preceded by “new era”-thinking according to
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which over-optimistic expectations of future incomes are seemingly justified, because “this
time is different”. Greenwood & Hanson (2013) find that credit market sentiment can be
well approximated by a combination of bond credit spreads relative to their historical means
and of the high yield share of bond issuance. The so-measured deterioration in issuer quality
induced by investors’ elevated sentiment can be a better predictor of credit overheating and
subsequent economic decline than rapid credit growth. López-Salido et al. (2017) find that
buoyant credit market sentiment is followed by a decline in economic activity two to three
years later, and by a change in the composition of external finance: An increasing equity
share in the issuance of corporate securities points towards the role of negative credit supply
shocks. The authors do not, however, narrow down their analyses of periods of declining
economic activity to those of financial recessions or banking crises. Baker & Wurgler (2000)
show that the equity share in total corporate securities issuance is a strong predictor of lower
future stock market returns. The authors rule out efficient market explanations, and thus
López-Salido et al. (2017) use the equity share as a proxy for stock market sentiment but
find that it has no predictive ability for economic growth. They come to a similar conclusion
when using Shiller’s (2000) cyclically adjusted price-earnings ratio as a proxy for stock market
sentiment. Regarding banking crises, however, Shiller (2016) provides a popular narrative
of sentiment-driven asset price bubbles that have a tendency to end in major bank distress
focusing on technological, economic, political, and cultural factors inducing over-optimism.
Much more well-established is the literature on investor sentiment and economic activity
according to which periods of buoyant sentiment lead to a predictable decline in economic
output in the near future. The observation of mean-reverting sentiment as a major driving
force behind fluctuations in the real economy is consistent with the business cycle literature.
Arif & Lee (2014) find that corporate investment peaks during periods of high sentiment
which is followed both by lower equity returns and lower economic growth, lending itself
to an interpretation of over- and under-investment during booms and busts, respectively.
The authors employ several proxies of investor sentiment—household surveys, fund flow
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data, and a composite sentiment index—and find their results to be robust to the choice of
sentiment approximation. Milani (2017) finds that above 40% of business cycle fluctuations
are driven by psychological factors in markets, and particularly by sentiment related to
future investment expectations. Using annual U.S. data going back to 1929, López-Salido
et al. (2017) report that elevated credit market sentiment is associated with a decline in
economic activity after two to three years. Investors sentiment is suspect to a predictable
mean reversion which induces a widening of credit spreads that, in turn, are associated with
economic contractions.
Into a similar vain fits the long-established literature around the prediction of reces-
sions using bond spreads, and particularly the difference between the yield of 3-month U.S.
Treasury bills and the yield of 10-year U.S. Treasury bonds.8 Narrow credit spreads—i.e.
the difference between yields of different quality (as represented by rating classes) but equal
maturity—in comparison to their historical averages reflect elevated sentiment and precede
economic recessions (López-Salido et al., 2017). Assuming that the risk of default stays
constant over time, as approximated by the restriction to one specific credit rating level (e.g.
BAA), the time-variation in spreads of corporate debt then represent changes in investor
sentiment. Intuitively, aggressively priced corporate credit reflects expectations of an overly
low risk of default. In turn, this increases lending activity and firms’ leverage making the
aggregate economy more susceptible to adverse shocks and increasing economic and finan-
cial fragility. Better suited for the prediction of recessions are, however, term spreads—i.e.
the difference between yields of different maturity but equal quality—turning negative, as
a vast literature has shown (Estrella & Mishkin, 1998). Very narrow or even negative term
spreads mean that short-term yields start to exceed longer-term yields for the same debtor,
indicating that market participants are increasingly willing to pay a premium for a more
long-term fixed investment to weather an anticipated economic slowdown and the associated
rise in economic uncertainty.
8 For an introduction to the use of the yield curve as a recession predictor in practice, see https://www.
newyorkfed.org/research/capital_markets/ycfaq.html.
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III. Financial fragility and the credit cycle
The idea that the economy can fluctuate between a state of financial stability and fragility
dates back to Minsky (1986) and Kindleberger & Aliber (2015), but can also be found
in earlier works of Schumpeter (1934), Fisher (1933) and even before in the writings of
John Stuart Mill, Knut Wicksell, and Adam Smith (Kindleberger & Aliber, 2015, p. 16).
No uniform definition of financial fragility exists in the literature but it is usually roughly
referred to as an economy’s state in which relatively small and otherwise less important
shocks can have large and potentially disastrous macroeconomic effects by being able to
trigger banking crises or deep recessions. What all discussions—old or new—of financial
fragility have in common, however, is the focus on (private) credit.
Does credit have an effect on macroeconomic outcomes? And if yes, is it positive or
negative? As one of the core themes of macroeconomics, this question has received vast
attention both historically and recently. While the positive post-World War II experience led
economist to investigate the so-called finance-growth nexus, confirming that credit was good
for growth (Levine, 2005; Ang, 2008), the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 reignited an older
debate that looked into the opposite direction and found that excessive credit growth and
leverage is and always has been associated with deep recessions and banking crises (Schularick
& Taylor, 2012; Baron & Xiong, 2017). López-Salido et al. (2017) recently introduced a
distinction of the respective literature into two strands: theories of financial frictions that
explain why economies exhibit financial vulnerabilities (Bernanke & Gertler, 1989; Kiyotaki
& Moore, 1997; Eggertsson & Krugman, 2012), and behavioral theories emphasizing market
sentiment and expectations which give rise to sudden reversals of overoptimism, thereby
functioning as recession or crisis triggers (Minsky, 1986; Greenwood et al., 2016). These two
strands play out over different time horizons. The former covers a medium-term time span
that could be related either to the frequency of the business cycle but also to longer waves of
credit cycles of 15 to 30 years as has been shown in the financial cycle literature (Drehmann
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et al., 2012; Borio, 2014; Strohsal et al., 2019).9 The latter strand takes on a more short-term
perspective with investors’ sentiment changing rapidly over the course of months, weeks, or
even days. Covas & Den Haan (2011, 2012) provide evidence for cyclicality in equity and
credit markets that revolves around the business cycle.
The credit-to-gdp gap
Financial fragility is commonly approximated by high domestic leverage. In particular, it has
been common practice since the Global Financial Crisis to look at private credit aggregates—
such as outstanding bank loans, household debt, or total credit to the private non-financial
sector. Especially, the so-called credit-to-GDP gap has risen to a position of great prominence
during the implementation of the Basel III regulatory framework in the aftermath of the
crisis. It is defined as the difference between the ratio of credit to the private non-financial
sector to GDP and the ratio’s long-term trend (Drehmann & Tsatsaronis, 2014). The Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision (2010) precisely defines this long-term trend as the trend
component of the private credit-to-GDP ratio extracted by an one-sided HP filter (Hodrick
& Prescott, 1997) with a smoothing parameter of λ = 400, 000. The resulting gap informs
the built-up of countercyclical capital buffers according to which national banks must ramp
up their capital reserve in response to increasing leverage in the domestic economy. The idea
is to have high capital ratios in boom times, so that eventual bank losses in the downturn
are first met by writing down the capital buffers.
The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) publishes credit-to-GDP gaps according
to the above definition and collects private credit and GDP data for more than 40 countries at
quarterly frequency. The BIS’ definition of the private non-financial sector consists of house-
holds, non-profit organizations, and private and public non-financial businesses as debtors.
9 There is a remarkable amount of disagreement and ambiguity on the time horizon of the credit cycle.
However, two main camps emerge from the literature: one that sees the credit cycle revolving around the
business cycle as presented by the view of López-Salido et al. (2017), and one that sees the credit cycle
playing out over time horizons of up to 30 years, as best presented by the financial cycle-view of the BIS
(Drehmann et al., 2012; Borio, 2014). Future research should explicitly address these ambiguities.
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It considers bank loans and debt securities but not equities, investment fund shares, insur-
ance and pension schemes, financial derivatives, trade credit, and other accounts payable or
receivable. (Dembiermont et al., 2013, p. 67).
For this study, I reconstruct the BIS’ private credit series as best as possible using
my new consistent time series of credit components available at quarterly frequency from
1900–2020: outstanding corporate debt securities, commercial paper, bank loans, and—in
the post-WWII era—various types of asset-backed securities. A consistent time series for
non-bank, non-securitized lending can unfortunately not be constructed and is thus omitted
from the private credit series I present in this paper. Figure A.10 in the appendix plots
the BIS’ estimation of the credit-to-GDP gap in comparison to the one that is based on my
historical data. I mirror the construction of the gap with my own data one-to-one. As can
be seen from the graph, the two data series yield very similar results with two peaks in the
late 1980s and around 2008.
Figure 4 displays the estimation of the credit-to-GDP gap using my data over the whole
time horizon. While the raw series begins in 1900, I backward extrapolate the private
credit series to the first quarter of 1890 using growth rates of total loans by national banks
and railroad bonds outstanding which are available at quarterly frequency before 1900. This
allows the gap to start at the first quarter of 1900 using the proxy data for the first ten years.
From the graph, we observe that the forward-looking gap estimate exhibits five pronounced
peak periods—around 1905, in 1931, in the 1950s, in the late 1980s, and in 2008—and three
marked troughs—after WWI, during the Great Depression, and after the Global Financial
Crisis. As is indicated by shaded areas in the graph, four out of these five peaks coincide
with periods of banking crises according to the definition of Baron & Dieckelmann (2021).
The troughs occur either in the aftermath of the two most severe banking crises—the Great
Depression and the Global Financial Crisis—or during times of war.
What drives peaks and troughs over the medium-term credit cycle? Sharp uptakes
in economic growth like during the war economies of world wars I and II drive down the
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Notes: The blue line depicts the credit-to-GDP gap based on my historically consistent series for
total credit to the private non-financial sector divided by GDP. The gap is computed as the deviation
from the series’ medium-term trend using a one-sided HP-filter with a smoothing parameter of
λ = 400, 000. Shaded areas in grey represent periods of banking crises according to Baron &
Dieckelmann (2021).
credit-to-GDP ratio abruptly and thus create an acute deviation from trend, causing the
credit-to-GDP gap to fall. Additionally, sharp credit contractions caused by major banking
crises cause the ratio’s numerator to collapse and put the ratio on a below-trend trajectory.
From the 1930s to the first half of the 1940s, both of these phenomena occur successively,
causing the HP filter to produce a far-below-trend gap estimate. The healthy economic
development after World War II characterized by stable and sustainable growth in credit
and GDP then induces a sharp reversal of the gap estimation into above-trend territory
which causes a false warning in the 1950s and 1960s if we interpret the credit-to-GDP as an
indicator of financial fragility. Sudden and substantial movements in the credit-to-GDP ratio
can induce spurious movements in the gap estimation that have no informational content for
the degree of financial fragility.
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The ongoing global economic crisis caused by the Covid-19 pandemic may have a simi-
lar effect: A rapid contraction of GDP with a simultaneous large-scale extension of private
credit to bridge the adverse economic effects of lock-downs will ramp up the credit-to-GDP
ratio suddenly and move the gap estimate most likely onto an above-trend trajectory. Natu-
rally, the Covid-19 crisis poses a threat to financial stability and, thus, a shooting up of the
credit-to-GDP gap could be seen as a desirable signal to inform a policy maker of heightened
financial fragility—I will argue, however, that this is a false signal as it does exactly not rep-
resent the gradual built-up of fragility brought about by an over-extension of credit that the
gap was designed to capture, but rather is caused by a sudden change in economic conditions
that should be reflected by indicators of López-Salido et al.’s (2017) second strand of the
credit cycle literature that captures market sentiment and sudden changes in expectations,
as I explained in the previous section.
Thus, the historical record not only shows that, first, large crisis events can distort the
informational content of the credit-to-GDP gap as an indicator of financial fragility, but
also that, second, we may be on the verge of receiving yet another such distorted signal
due to extraordinary consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic. Third, we have seen that the
ability of the credit-to-GDP gap to measure financial fragility works well in hindsight but
may depend significantly on at what point in time the estimation commences.10 Last, it is
not immediately visible form the stylized facts whether the credit-to-GDP can be useful for
the correct timing of crisis events. While its recent popularity is explained by the fact the it
would have worked well before the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008, the picture is less
clear with regard to the Great Depression or the Savings and Loan crisis of the 1980s. In the
following, I turn to securities issuance-based proxies of credit and equity market sentiment
to investigate the possibility of more precise and timely warning signals of imminent crises.
10 This phenomenon is known to the financial cycle literature as the “starting-point bias” (Geršl & Seidler,
2012; Drehmann & Tsatsaronis, 2014). The BIS’ credit-to-GDP gap does not indicate any above-trend
leverage prior to the 1980s as the data coverage starts only in 1952. Using longer data starting in 1900,
however, induces a spurious positive value throughout the post-WWII era, as I have shown previously.
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Predicting banking crises
Considering the limited usefulness of the de-trended credit aggregate to predict periods of
bank distress, I question its ability to proxy financial fragility. If fragility is defined as a
state of high susceptibility to external shocks we would expect sudden reversals in market
sentiment during periods of high domestic leverage in comparison to historical averages to
function as crisis triggers. This is the triggers-plus-vulnerabilities hypothesis of López-Salido
et al. (2017). In the following, I test this hypothesis by regressing pre-crisis periods on the
credit and equity sentiment proxies se and se, on the credit-to-GDP gap c, and on interaction
terms of the former two with the latter.11 A pre-crisis period is defined as the four quarters
prior to the starting quarter of a banking crisis. Since this independent variable is coded as




= β0 + β1s
e + β2s
c + β3c+ β4(s
e × c) + β5(sc × c) + ε (3)
where πp is interpreted as the probability of an impending banking crisis within the next
four quarters. Table 3 presents the estimation results.
The general take-away from the regression results in Table 3 is that sentiment proxies
clearly outperform the credit aggregate in explaining periods of financial fragility, as defined
by four consecutive pre-crisis quarters.12 With a pseudo R2 of 0.02, the credit-to-GDP gap is
a very weak predictor of fragility in comparison to equity sentiment (pseudo R2 = 0.173) and
credit sentiment (pseudo R2 = 0.051). Although the coefficient is positive and significant,
indicating that excessive leverage is indeed followed by bank distress, the low coefficient
of determination indicates that many other periods of high leverage are not followed by
crises. As expected, a deterioration in both equity and credit sentiment is predictive of bank
11 Recall that the sentiment proxies are estimated forecasts of future stock returns or term spreads, respec-
tively, on the basis of measures of past securities issuance activity.
12 These results are robust with regard to longer pre-crisis horizons and other credit aggregate measures,
such as a credit gap computed from bank loans instead of from total credit or conventional credit-to-GDP
ratios.
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Table 3: Financial fragility and market sentiment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pre-crisis Pre-crisis Pre-crisis Pre-crisis Pre-crisis Pre-crisis
Equity sentiment se −26.94∗∗∗ −25.76∗∗∗ −25.34∗∗∗ −24.82∗∗∗
(5.13) (5.43) (5.62) (6.08)
Credit sentiment sc 222.79∗∗ 146.38∗ 137.20 130.64
(92.91) (88.85) (88.20) (79.80)
Credit−to−GDP gap c 5.10∗∗ 2.47 0.85
(2.36) (2.46) (2.00)
se × c 14.20
(47.68)
sc × c 2716.19∗∗
(1084.05)
Constant −3.43∗∗∗ −3.56∗∗∗ −3.47∗∗∗ −3.53∗∗∗ −3.56∗∗∗ −3.82∗∗∗
(0.29) (0.31) (0.27) (0.32) (0.33) (0.37)
Observations 477 473 481 472 471 471
Pseudo R2 0.173 0.051 0.020 0.195 0.198 0.234
Notes: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence level, respectively. The table
shows estimations for logistic regressions of pre-crisis periods, which refer to the four quarters prior to the
start of banking crisis events. Positive equity sentiment values represent buoyancy while positive credit
sentiment values indicate pessimism.
distress. 13 Thus, it is no wonder that taking sentiment proxies and the credit aggregate
together in model five only marginally increases the predictive ability of model four which
includes sentiment measures only. The coefficient of the credit gap becomes insignificant,
too. Interacting both sentiment proxies with the credit aggregate in model six, however,
yields an interesting result: While the contribution to predictive ability of equity sentiment
remains largely unchanged, and importantly remains significant only independently of the
credit-to-GDP gap, credit sentiment becomes highly significant when interacted with the
credit gap. This means that equity sentiment is a predictor of bank distress irrespective of
credit aggregates—a result that goes along nicely with recent findings by Baron et al. (2021)
who show that substantial bank equity declines are predictive of banking crises. Contrarily,
a deterioration of credit sentiment is predictive of bank distress only if it is accompanied
13 Recall that a positive value for the equity sentiment proxy indicates buoyancy while a positive value for the
credit sentiment proxy—as it refers to an expected widening of term spreads—represents a shift towards
pessimism.
25
by high leverage, returning some credibility to López-Salido et al.’s (2017) trigger-plus-
vulnerabilities hypothesis.
Next, I take on a slightly longer-term perspective and investigate how sentiment and
the credit aggregate evolve twenty quarters before and after crisis periods. The idea is, first,
to shed some light on the question whether sentiment builds up alongside credit and could
thus be a potential driver of credit booms, and, second, to investigate the horizon over which
reversals of sentiment prior to crises play out. For this, I regress the sentiment proxies and
the credit-to-GDP gap on twenty lags, twenty leads, and the contemporaneous value of the
banking crisis starting date dummy. I include the constant in the regressions but exclude
it from the graphs and plot the coefficient estimates and their confidence intervals as event
studies in Figure 5.14
The first plot in Figure 5 shows the average development of the equity sentiment proxy
5 years before and after the start of banking crises. It is immediately visible that around four
quarters before the start of a crisis equity sentiment declines drastically to below zero, even
though only the estimate for the last quarter before the beginning of the crisis is significant
at the 95% level. This is matched by a deterioration of credit sentiment three quarters prior,
as indicated by a borderline significant and positive surge in the foretasted corporate term
spread. The credit-to-GDP gap, being the credit-based proxy for financial fragility, shows
no interesting behavior with the exception that its value is slightly above zero on average
but not significantly. The forward-looking credit gap estimate is only significantly different
from zero and positive four quarters into to the crisis which I attribute mainly to a stronger
decline in GDP than in total credit occurring during the crises in the sample. The observed
behavior of the credit gap is fundamentally different from what we would expect from the
perspective of a vulnerabilities-interpretation of the credit cycle according to which fragility
builds up a gradually to very high levels prior to crises, as proxied by high domestic leverage
in comparison to its historical trend.
14 I use a robust estimation method for the standard errors to achieve variance over time in the event studies.
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Notes: Depicted are coefficient estimates from regressing the variables on 20 leads and lags of
the banking crisis start dummy. Vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Positive equity
sentiment values represent buoyancy while positive credit sentiment values indicate pessimism.
Along the same lines fits the observation that buoyant market sentiment does not seem
to be persistently sustained in the medium-term run-up to banking crises. Neither equity
nor credit sentiment follow statistically significant non-zero trajectories prior to crises. Since
neither the credit gap consistently surges prior to crises, nor buoyant sentiment is sustained
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over a sufficiently long time horizon, I can rule out the hypothesis that market sentiment is
a driver of credit booms that end in banking crises. Furthermore, equity sentiment has a
tendency to quickly return to (around) the value of zero after five to ten quarters, displaying
mean-reverting behavior which is in line with the literature (De Long et al., 1990; López-
Salido et al., 2017). The key message from Table 3 is mirrored in these findings, namely that
it’s not the excessive built-up of credit on potentially irrational grounds that predict banking
crises, but instead the sudden reversal of such buoyant sentiment. The fact that equity
issuance reversals predict banking crises without elevated private credit levels, suggests that
changes in investor sentiment can trigger financial crises even in the absence of underlying
banking fragility. I thus give much more weight to the triggers-aspect of López-Salido et al.’s
(2017) interpretation of the credit cycle than to the vulnerabilities-side. I interpret the
evidence in such a way that it is not the built-up of leverage that causes banking crises, it is
the moment when external finance stops coming which causes the system to fold.
In light of this interpretation, I argue for revisiting the definition of financial fragility as
a state of susceptibility to shocks and the use of credit aggregates as its main measure. The
results presented above show that banking crises unfold irrespective of a long-term built-up
of leverage—and thus, potentially independently of the state of financial fragility, as it is
currently defined. Naturally, this interpretation has several important caveats. First, it rests
on the approximation of market sentiment through measures of corporate securities issuance.
It remains an open question whether other proxies confirm the important role of sentiment
in a banking crises setting. Second, all results are obviously limited to the United States.
Having a rather market-based financial system is certainly an important factor in explaining
why corporate securities issuance is such a well-functioning predictor. Third, due to the lack
of quarterly data prior to World War II, credit by financial intermediaries other than banks
is excluded from the analysis. As a final exercise, I test the discovered predictive capabilities




To test the usefulness of this section’s findings for policy makers, I move the analysis from an
ex post to an ex ante perspective and assess the predictive capabilities of my corporate secu-
rities issuance measures for banking crises out-of-sample. Importantly, this means that the
previously estimated sentiment proxies cannot be used for this exercise since the respective
fitted values are estimated over the entire sample size and time horizon. Instead, I estimate
the sentiment proxies recursively using only observations that were available at each point
in time. The credit-to-GDP gap is already a forward-looking measure and can thus be kept.
Otherwise, I use the same logistic regression model (3) as in the previous subsection and
estimate this model through the first quarter of 2005 such that the pre-crisis observations
of the subsequent Subprime Crisis are excluded from the model estimation. I then compute
predicted values out-of-sample for the second quarter of 2005 through the second quarter of
2009. The start of the banking crisis is dated to when it became systemic after the collapse
of Lehman Brothers in the third quarter of 2008 in accordance with Baron & Dieckelmann
(2021). Model estimation results are presented in Table 4.
From Table 4 we can confirm that the recursively estimated sentiment proxies behave
very similarly to their full-sample counterparts. Significance levels and coefficient signs are
comparable to those presented in Table 3. Since the proxies themselves represent forecasts
of future equity returns or corporate term spreads, respectively, it is not surprising that
their predictive ability for banking crises does not change in an ex ante scenario. A second
and very important finding is that, with a pseudo R2 of 0.001, the credit-to-GDP gap is
totally unrelated to banking crises when the Subprime crisis is removed from the sample.
This adds to the poor performance previously reported in Table 3: The de-trended credit
aggregate alone is a poor predictor of banking crises and, thus, by definition also a poor
proxy for financial fragility. When adding the interaction terms in model six, an even more
striking finding comes to light: An above-trend value of the credit-to-GDP gap significantly
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Table 4: Model estimation for out-of-sample exercise, 1900–2005q1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pre-crisis Pre-crisis Pre-crisis Pre-crisis Pre-crisis Pre-crisis
Recursive equity sentiment seR −21.32∗∗∗ −20.48∗∗∗ −21.21∗∗∗ −19.90∗∗∗
(4.73) (5.31) (5.19) (5.61)
Recursive credit sentiment scR 170.47
∗ 118.49 128.99 138.80
(97.86) (97.11) (87.85) (94.13)
Credit−to−GDP gap c 1.25 −2.79 −3.72∗
(2.53) (2.24) (1.90)
seR × c 29.38
(37.91)
scR × c 1328.08∗
(815.35)
Constant −3.73∗∗∗ −3.57∗∗∗ −3.55∗∗∗ −3.71∗∗∗ −3.72∗∗∗ −3.78∗∗∗
(0.40) (0.34) (0.30) (0.38) (0.38) (0.36)
Observations 397 392 421 392 392 392
Pseudo R2 0.219 0.042 0.001 0.237 0.242 0.257
Notes: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence level, respectively. The table
shows estimations for logistic regressions of pre-crisis periods, which refer to the four quarters prior to the
start of banking crisis events. Positive equity sentiment values represent buoyancy while positive credit
sentiment values indicate pessimism.
reduces financial fragility when it is not associated with buoyant sentiment in credit markets.
Recalling the insignificance of the standalone credit gap coefficient in model six of the full-
sample exercise in Table 3, I conclude that if aggregate leverage is not accompanied by
buoyant sentiment it also does not induce financial fragility. This stands in opposition to
López-Salido et al.’s (2017) triggers-plus-vulnerabilities interpretation of the credit cycle, as
my findings suggest that credit booms themselves are irrelevant for financial fragility if they
are not accompanied by buoyant sentiment. It is thus not leverage itself that induces fragility,
but it is the deterioration in sentiment from a formerly over-optimistic market environment
that induces crises: Again, it is not credit that causes crises, it is when credit stops coming
that turmoil breaks loose.
In the following, I use model six from Table 4 to compute fitted values out of sample and
derive forward-looking banking crises probabilities. The input variables are plotted in the
left plot of Figure 6, and the out-of-sample predictions are displayed on the right-hand side.
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Notes: Recursively predicted and forward-looking probabilties of impending banking crisis from
2005 to the beginning of 2009. The start of the banking crisis is dated to the collapse of Lehman
Brothers in the third quarter of 2008, as indicated by the vertical line. Positive equity sentiment
values represent buoyancy while positive credit sentiment values indicate pessimism.
The credit-to-GDP gap is at elevated levels during the run-up to the Subprime crisis. The
forward-looking proxy for equity sentiment is optimistic up until the beginning of 2008 and
then deteriorates into pessimistic territory in the second quarter of 2008. Credit sentiment
moves from buoyancy in 2005 and 2006, into a neutral zone in 2007, and ultimately reverses
rapidly in the first and second quarter of 2008. The reversal of sentiment is mirrored in
the out-of-sample predictions. In the six months before the collapse of Lehman Brothers,
the model exhibits a drastic surge in the predicted probability of banking crisis within the
next four quarters. In line with results from the events studies in Figure 5, sudden reversals
in sentiment contain significant predictive information of impending banking crises, and a
respective sentiment-based model trained with 100 years of historical data up until 2005
would have issued a warning signal half a year ahead of time.
IV. Economic activity and recessions
The second major field of analysis of this study is the role of market sentiment proxied by
corporate securities issuance in explaining real economic activity. In particular, I test its
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ability to predict future real GDP growth and recessions. I start out by plotting real GDP
growth against my sentiment proxies in Figure 7 to inspect the sentiment dynamics over the
business cycle.
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Recession Equity sentiment Credit sentiment Real GDP growth
Notes: The sentiment proxies refer to in-sample predictions on the basis of model estimations (1)
and (2). Shaded areas in grey represent periods of recessions according to the National Bureau
of Economic Research. Positive equity sentiment values represent buoyancy while positive credit
sentiment values indicate pessimism.
In a first inspection of Figure 7, we observe that an expected decline in stock prices—as
indicated by a negative value of the equity sentiment proxy—is associated with economic
slowdowns. Particularly, recessions seem to follow after periods of declining equity sentiment,
even though the forecasted return may not be negative. An expected widening of credit
spreads—as indicated by a positive value of the credit sentiment proxy—tends to coincide
with declining economic activity and recessions. After the end of recessions, credit sentiment
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takes on rather low values indicating the expectation of a lower term spread in the future.
Further, recessions tend to occur after long periods of buoyant credit sentiment which is in
line with one of the main findings of López-Salido et al. (2017). From these stylized facts,
both equity and credit sentiment seem to exhibit pro-cyclical behavior.
In a simple vector auto-regressive (VAR) model, I analyze this observation in more
detail: I regress real GDP growth, nominal total credit growth,15 equity sentiment, and




AiYt−i + et (4)
where c is a k-dimensional vector of constants and Yt is a four-dimensional vector of time
series—namely real GDP growth, total credit growth, the equity sentiment proxy, and the
credit sentiment proxy. Ai are k× k matrices of coefficients, et is the error term vector, and
p is called the order of the VAR and corresponds to the number of lags included for each
variable and is set according to a majority of standard information criteria to p = 7.16
The estimation of model (4) is displayed in the appendix in Table A.8. After estimating
the VAR model, I use Wald tests to check for Granger causality between economic growth,
credit growth, and the respective market sentiment proxies. Specifically, I test for each of the
four variables, first, the null hypothesis that the estimated coefficients of the lagged values
of each explanatory variable are jointly zero and, second, an alternative null hypothesis
that estimated coefficients of the lagged values of all explanatory variables are jointly zero.
If a null hypothesis cannot be rejected at a certain confidence level, this is equivalent to
saying that Granger causality cannot be rejected. It is important to highlight that Granger
causality of course does not imply actual causation but rather showcases the usefulness of
lagged values of a certain variable (or of all variables jointly) for predicting one of the four
variables specified in the VAR model. The Wald test results are shown below in Table 5.
15 The results hold when using real credit growth instead.
16 The order of the model fits well with the general time horizon of up to two years over which asset prices
generally have been found to be predictive of economic activity (Stock & Watson, 2003).
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Table 5: Wald tests for Granger causality
χ2 df p
∆(GDP/CPI)
∆(total credit) 13.162 7 0.068
Equity sentiment 27.785 7 0.0002
Credit sentiment 7.210 7 0.407
ALL 52.597 21 0.0002
∆(total credit)
∆(GDP/CPI) 22.003 7 0.003
Equity sentiment 10.441 7 0.165
Credit sentiment 1.088 7 0.993
ALL 33.898 21 0.037
Equity sentiment
∆(GDP/CPI) 30.081 7 0.00009
∆(total credit) 13.581 7 0.0592
Credit sentiment 48.173 7 3.29 × 10−8
ALL 99.544 21 3.47 × 10−12
Credit sentiment
∆(GDP/CPI) 21.650 7 0.003
∆(total credit) 11.537 7 0.117
Equity sentiment 41.757 7 5.79 × 10−7
ALL 101.878 21 1.34 × 10−12
Notes: χ2 refers to the test statistic, df denotes degrees of freedom, and p
is the p-value indicating statistical significance. ∆ is the one-quarter growth
operator. The respective recipient variables of Granger causality are printed
in italics. ALL refers to a test of Granger causality originating from the
lagged values of all remaining variables jointly.
The results in Table 5 reveal some interesting facts: At 99% confidence, equity sentiment
and economic activity exhibit strong bidirectional Granger causality, implying that while eq-
uity sentiment contains predictive information for economic growth, the reverse holds true
as well. This in line with findings of Stock & Watson (2003). Summing over the estimated
coefficients in Table A.8 clearly yields a positive value and, thus, shows that buoyant senti-
ment in stock markets is predictive of future economic activity and vice versa. Interestingly,
this does not hold for credit sentiment. The forecast of future corporate term spreads is not
predictive of Real GDP at any reasonable confidence level (p = 0.407). The reverse direc-
tion, however, is. The immediate conclusion from this finding is that credit sentiment—as
proxied by corporate securities issuance—cannot be a driver of economic activity and, thus,
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cannot lead the business cycle. One potential channel through which credit sentiment could
drive the business cycle is the credit cycle (López-Salido et al., 2017). When we examine
the Granger causality properties of nominal credit growth, we observe that credit sentiment
holds virtually no predictive information for the credit aggregate (p = 0.993). While to-
tal credit alone Granger-causes real GDP at about 93% confidence, no role for sentiment
can be found in this context. While this does not speak directly against a business-cycle
interpretation of the credit cycle, as suggested by López-Salido et al. (2017), it rules out,
however, the interpretation that the driving force behind a credit-based business cycle is
market sentiment. In summary, I find that equity sentiment performs well in forecasting
economic activity while this cannot be said for credit sentiment. In the following subsection,
I investigate whether sudden changes in either sentiment proxy are helpful in predicting
economic decline, i.e. recessions.
Predicting recessions
To better understand how sentiment dynamics evolve around recessions, I again compute
event studies and regress both sentiment proxies on twenty lags, twenty leads, and the
contemporaneous value of the recession starting date dummy. Recessions are dated according
to the National Bureau of Economic Research.17 Event studies are depicted in Figure 8.
The main take-away from both plots in Figure 8 is that both sentiment proxies signal
future recessions by diverging from zero at 95% confidence ahead of time. Equity sentiment
starts deteriorating two to three quarters prior to a crisis, although only the quarter directly
prior to the business cycle peak is statistically significant. This explains why López-Salido
et al. (2017) do not find that their equity sentiment proxies predict economic downturns:
They use annual data and are unable to detect the historically persistent effect at higher
17 The NBER dates recessions such that they start at the peak of a business cycle and end at the trough.
My recession starting dummy thus corresponds to the quarter at which the business cycle is at its peak.
See https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions, ac-
cessed on November 11, 2020.
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Notes: Depicted are coefficient estimates from regressing the variables on 20 leads and lags of
the recession start dummy. Vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Recessions are dated
according to the National Bureau of Economic Research. Positive equity sentiment values represent
buoyancy while positive credit sentiment values indicate pessimism.
frequencies. The picture is different for credit sentiment, however: Here, we observe that
a statistically significant deterioration of sentiment occurs up to nine quarters ahead of
the beginning of a recession. My credit sentiment proxy seems to be particularly useful in
predicting recessions over a horizon of nine to four quarters ahead of business cycle peaks.
I can thus confirm López-Salido et al.’s (2017) finding that elevated credit sentiment two
years prior is associated with economic decline. It is, however, not buoyant sentiment that
predicts the recession but rather the rapid and significant deterioration of sentiment starting
up to two years prior that heralds the beginning of the downturn.
Before I go deeper into analyzing how sentiment is connected to recessions and how this
relationship can be exploited for their prediction, I can already establish that, while credit
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sentiment performs poorly in forecasting GDP growth, it excels at predicting recessions.
There is preliminary evidence that equity sentiment is useful in predicting both, but on rather
short notice. Further, and similar to what I discussed previously with regard to banking
crises, it seems that particularly the reversal of sentiment is the defining characteristic that
contains the predictive information. Next, I set up a logistic regression model similar to
model (3) in the previous section to test the in-sample performance and the forecasting














t−i + ε (5)
where πp is interpreted as the probability of recession, and j is the number of included lags,
which I set to four and eight, respectively. Estimation results are displayed in Table 6.
The results confirm the key findings of the event studies. Equity sentiment deteriorates
with statistical significance one to two quarters before the business cycle peaks, indicating
that reversals in equity issuance activity signal recessions two to three quarters ahead of
time.18 Credit sentiment is predictive of downturns, too, but at a longer time horizon: As
model specifications three to six show, a sudden deterioration of sentiment—indicated by
a relatively large and positive coefficient estimate—four to five quarters before the peak of
the business cycle significantly increases the probability of an impending recession. Thus,
corporate debt issuance activity contains predictive information of impending downturns up
to two years ahead of time, which is in line with what López-Salido et al. (2017) find using
their own credit sentiment proxy.
The fact that I use higher frequency data, however, reveals an important distinction
from what is already known about sentiment and recessions. The estimation results in Table
6 do not allow for an interpretation where recessions occur after long periods of buoyant
equity and credit sentiment. Instead, the only statistically significant feature that produces
18 Note that at time t, the sentiment proxies contain historical data only, as equations (1) and (2) include
one to four lags but no contemporaneous values of the corporate securities issuance measures.
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Table 6: Recessions and market sentiment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RS RS RS RS RS RS
Equity sentiment −7.28 −8.67 −6.36 −8.70
(5.86) (6.09) (6.41) (6.96)
L.Equity sentiment −11.55∗ −11.55 −13.07∗∗ −15.82∗∗
(6.82) (7.67) (6.48) (7.25)
L2.Equity sentiment −5.32 −5.97 −7.46 −17.10∗
(7.11) (8.69) (7.98) (9.37)
L3.Equity sentiment 10.38∗∗ 11.54∗ 13.58∗∗ 10.08
(4.58) (6.04) (5.55) (7.99)
L4.Equity sentiment 8.65 9.98 11.49∗ 20.90∗
(7.22) (8.48) (7.04) (11.23)
L5.Equity sentiment 3.76 16.82∗∗
(8.09) (8.32)
L6.Equity sentiment −3.48 −3.90
(7.71) (9.40)
L7.Equity sentiment 6.99 0.48
(10.25) (11.44)
L8.Equity sentiment −2.52 −3.97
(8.17) (8.25)
Credit sentiment 31.08 40.71 0.65 −13.26
(63.75) (69.37) (62.51) (68.93)
L.Credit sentiment 63.77 18.17 6.72 −64.92
(55.87) (54.98) (63.39) (64.00)
L2.Credit sentiment −39.79 −114.95∗∗ −22.12 −108.76∗
(50.30) (48.60) (52.98) (61.97)
L3.Credit sentiment −47.68 −103.91 5.99 30.30
(79.29) (92.52) (77.44) (110.09)
L4.Credit sentiment 106.30∗ 121.88∗ 165.34∗∗ 294.96∗∗∗
(64.92) (67.33) (68.69) (81.05)
L5.Credit sentiment 89.26 192.56∗∗
(63.49) (89.94)
L6.Credit sentiment 54.16 33.22
(68.91) (78.61)
L7.Credit sentiment −31.95 −147.57∗
(48.89) (78.49)
L8.Credit sentiment 15.82 −81.42
(68.37) (91.85)
Constant −3.00∗∗∗ −3.14∗∗∗ −3.05∗∗∗ −3.13∗∗∗ −3.12∗∗∗ −3.30∗∗∗
(0.24) (0.31) (0.23) (0.24) (0.28) (0.34)
Observations 473 469 465 457 464 456
Pseudo R2 0.026 0.035 0.025 0.043 0.054 0.098
Notes: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence level, respectively. The table shows
estimations for logistic regressions of quarters that mark the beginning of a recession RS, according to the
NBER’s methodology. Positive equity sentiment values represent buoyancy while positive credit sentiment
values indicate pessimism.
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the proxies’ predictive power are the sudden reversals of sentiment that play out over a
time horizon of a few quarters. It is thus—similar to what I find with regard to financial
fragility—not periods of overly optimistic market sentiment that drive the business cycle but
it is its sudden reversal that induces the end of the boom. In line with Bordalo et al. (2018) it
is when ”good news stop coming” that economies slow down. This proposition further lends
itself very well to the commonly accepted observation that there is little regularity to the
business cycle (which is why business cycle is such a notorious misnomer). Notwithstanding
the well-established role of rational expectations and exogenous shocks for the business cycle,
my results show that shifts in market participants’ irrationally formed expectations—that is,
investors decisions disconnected from fundamentals—also play a significant role in perturbing
economic activity and in inducing downturns.
My analysis shows that equity market sentiment has predictive power for both economic
activity and economic downturns. I, thus, suggest that investors sentiment in equity markets
is indeed a potential driver of the business cycle. This, however, does not hold for credit
sentiment. Credit sentiment is only predictive of recessions but not of economic growth,
and I thus rule out the hypothesis that a sentiment-driven credit cycle is a major driver of
the business cycle. Not the quantity of credit determines economic activity, but the sudden
absence of credit will send the economy down the drain. Policy makers would do well in
looking at issuance activity in corporate securities markets to complement their tools for
growth and recession forecasts.
V. Conclusion
This study investigates the role of corporate securities issuance in approximating investor
sentiment in credit and equity markets and the role of sentiment in explaining economic
activity and financial fragility. In particular, I contribute to the existing literature in four
distinct ways.
First, I present new historical U.S. data at quarterly frequency from 1900–2020 on the
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gross issuance of equities and corporate debt securities, and a historically consistent estimate
of total private credit mainly based on quarterly data of outstanding corporate debt and total
bank loans. Second, I use several measures of corporate securities issuance to forecast future
equity returns and corporate term spreads, respectively. Following López-Salido et al. (2017),
I interpret these forecasts as sentiment proxies and investigate their role in explaining and
predicting financial fragility, banking crises, economic activity, and recessions at quarterly
frequency. Third, I provide a historical assessment of credit aggregates—and particularly
of the one-sided credit-to-GDP gap—and their role in proxying financial fragility as well as
their ability to predict banking crises in real time. Fourth, I present policy makers with a
complement to their tool box for predicting recessions and banking crises by proposing to
harness the informational content in higher-frequency data on corporate securities issuance
whereby sudden reversals of issuance activity signal a sudden drop in investors sentiment
that is highly predictive of impending recessions and banking crises several quarters ahead
of time.
The main finding of this paper is that in the United States from 1900–2020 sudden
reversals in equity and credit market sentiment proxied by corporate securities issuance are
highly predictive of impending banking crises over an average time horizon of six months
and of future recessions up to two years ahead of time. Issuance activity outperforms the
private credit-to-GDP gap in its capacity to predict banking fragility in and out of sample.
Deviations in equity issuance from historical averages also help to explain economic activity
over the business cycle. Crises and recessions often occur independently of domestic leverage,
making the credit-to-GDP gap a deficient early-warning indicator in historical application. I
do not find convincing evidence that credit market sentiment is a driver of the business cycle
or that it induces the built-up of financial fragility in the form of above-trend private credit
levels. The fact that equity issuance reversals predict banking crises without elevated private
credit levels, suggests that changes in investor sentiment can trigger financial crises even in
the absence of underlying banking fragility. A recently proposed triggers-plus-vulnerabilities
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interpretation of the credit cycle by López-Salido et al. (2017) seems less likely to hold in
light of my findings, as financial fragility measures based on credit aggregates perform poorly
in predicting the economy’s susceptibility to shocks, putting a much stronger focus on the
strength of triggers than on the vulnerabilities induced by private sector leverage. In my
sample, periods of sustained buoyant sentiment only rarely precede crises and recessions.
The evidence rather points towards short moments of drastic reversal in issuance activity—
and thus, in sentiment—that serve as triggers. Novel quarterly data on bank lending further
supports the interpretation that not the built-up of private credit is responsible for financial
fragility and bank distress, but its sudden retraction. In line with Bordalo et al. (2018), I
conclude that it is ”when good news stop coming” that the economy falters.
My findings are highly relevant for policy makers concerned with the prediction of
recessions and banking crises. First, my results should be seen as a reason for caution in the
application of the credit-to-GDP gap when determining the counter-cyclical capital buffers
under the Basel accords. Its prominence rests mainly on its strong predictive performance
prior to the Global Financial Crisis, but my historical assessments casts doubt on its general
applicability and usefulness. Second, policy makers should add the surveillance of gross
issuance activity in corporate securities markets at high frequencies to their macro-prudential
tool set. The informational content in sudden reversals of issuance activity is predictive of
crises and recessions several quarters ahead of time.
As an avenue for further research, the predictive ability of corporate securities issuance
should further be investigated by expanding this analysis to more countries at similar time
spans and frequencies. Finding the necessary data for this undertaking is certainly no easy
endeavor but will shed light on the important question whether this study’s findings hold in
less market-centered and more bank-focused financial systems, as well.
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Appendix






1900q1 1920q1 1940q1 1960q1 1980q1 2000q1 2020q1
Banking crisis Equity issuance-to-price ratio
Notes: This measure is defined as equity issuanceequity index level , the division of gross equity issuance per quarter
by the accumulated quarterly returns of the Dow Jones Industrial Average since the first quarter
of 1900 at the end of the same quarter. Due to the unit mismatch between nominator (millions of
U.S. dollars) and denominator (index points), the resulting ratio is not interpretable in levels but
only in growth rates. Shaded areas in grey represent periods of banking crises according to Baron
& Dieckelmann (2021).
The equity issuance-to-price ratio can be interpreted as managers’ anticipation of future capital
needs. I interpret sudden increases in gross equity issuance in comparison to the equity price level
as managers making use of a buoyant investment environment to raise new capital expectation of
impending commercial hardship. Managers exploit informational asymmetries in the equity market
to raise capital while investors are not aware of the expected decline in profits to which they would
of course react by selling stocks, resulting in falling prices. From the graph, it is visible that the
ratio tends to shoot up shortly before periods of bank distress—like in 1907, in the 1930s, or in the
1980s—or of general financial instability—like at the outbreak of World War I in 1914 or in the
early 1920s. To the most recent banking crisis, however, managers reacted too late, indicating that
the downturn was unexpected by managers and investors alike.
For the purpose of estimating the sentiment proxies, I exclude the equity-issuance-to-price ratio as
it adds virtually no new informational content to the regression: variation from equity issuance and
lagged stock returns is already captured by other variables. The ratio is depicted here to underline
the usefulness of issuance data for crisis prediction.
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1960q1 1970q1 1980q1 1990q1 2000q1 2010q1 2020q1
BIS credit-to-GDP gap Historically consistent credit-to-GDP gap
Notes: The red line represents the forward-looking gap estimate with my historically consistent
total credit series. The blue line is the official credit-to-GDP gap estimate based on more complete
data as published by the BIS.
The BIS’ private credit data for the United States starts in the first quarter of 1952 and the trend is
estimated for the first time after 10 years of continuous data coverage such that the first estimation
is for the first quarter of 1962. The HP filter is applied one-sidedly which means that it is re-
estimated recursively with every successive quarter to include only data which are available up to
the point in time of the estimation and to prevent a look-ahead bias.
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Table A.7: Data construction and sources
Variable Construction and Sources
Total credit Sum of total bank loans, non-financial corporate bonds outstanding, non-
financial commercial paper outstanding, and municipal bonds backed by cor-
porations outstanding.
Bank loans From 1945q4: Until 1951q4 interpolated from annual data on the ba-
sis of quarterly growth rates from “all bank data” and if not avail-
able from national bank data. Afterwards quarterly data directly
from source. Source: Loans, all private depository institutions,
from Z.1 financial accounts from the Federal Reserve available at
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BOGZ1FL704023005Q. Histor-
ical all bank data and national bank data from various Annual Re-
ports of the Comptroller of the Currency, available at https://fraser.
stlouisfed.org/title/annual-report-comptroller-currency-56, and
various Fed Bulletins available at https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/
federal-reserve-bulletin-62. From 1900q1 to 1945q3: Backward ex-
tended on the basis of total loans from all bank data (source see above). When
all bank data was not available, resorting to Fed member bank data, and
when that was not available, resorting to national bank data. Source for Fed
member bank data: Board of Governors (1943, pp. 72–75, Table No. 18).
Corporate bonds 1900q1 to 1943q4: Hickman (1953, pp. 308–309, appendix A, Table A-
13) available at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/M10083USM311NNBR.
From 1944q1: Until 1951q4 interpolated from annual data, afterwards quar-
terly data. From Z.1 Financial accounts from the Federal Reserve available at
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CBLBSNNCB.
Commercial paper From 1945q4: Until 1951q4 interpolated from annual data, afterwards quar-
terly data. From Z.1 Financial accounts from the Federal Reserve available
at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPLBSNNCB. In 1945, commercial
paper outstanding was less than 0.25% of total credit, it thus excluded for prior
dates due to little importance and lack of reliable data.
Municipal bonds Municipal bonds backed by corporations. From 1952q1: Quarterly data from
Z.1 Financial accounts from the Federal Reserve. Available at https://fred.
stlouisfed.org/series/MSLBSNNCB. Zero prior to 1971.
Gross domestic product From 1947q1: Quarterly data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis
available at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GDP. Before: Backward
extended on the basis of quarterly growth rates of gross national product data
by Gordon (1986, appendix B) until 1890q1. Available at https://www.nber.
org/research/data/tables-american-business-cycle.
Consumer price index From 1913q1: Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items in
U.S. City Average as reported by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Available
at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCNS. Before: Backward ex-
tension on the basis of quarterly growth rates of GNP deflator data by Gordon
(1986, appendix B) until 1900q1.
Credit-to-GDP gap One-sided HP-filter applied to total credit series divided by GDP se-
ries with smoothing parameter λ = 400, 000 and first data point in
1900q1 based on further backward extended data from 1890q1. Back-
ward extension on the basis of quarterly growth rates of interpolated an-
nual data on railroad bonds outstanding from Hickman (1953, p. 252)
and quarterly national bank loans from various annual reports of the
Comptroller of the Currency available at https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/
title/annual-report-comptroller-currency-56.
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Table A.7: Data construction and sources (continued)
Variable Construction and Sources
Corporate term spread From 1984q1: BAA corporate bond yield as reported by Moody’s and made
available at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAA minus 3 month-
commercial paper rate as reported by the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System before August 1997 under https://fred.stlouisfed.org/
series/CP3M and afterwards the non-financial 3-month AA commercial pa-
per rate available at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPN3M. From
1900q1 to 1983q4: corporate bond yield minus commercial paper rate as re-
ported by Gordon (1986, appendix B).
Stock prices From 1900q1: From daily closing price data of the Dow Jones Industrial Av-
erage by Samuel H. Williamson, available at https://www.measuringworth.
com/datasets/DJA/.
Total issuance Sum of equity and debt issuance.
Equity issuance From 1900q1 to 1905q4: Interpolated from annual data on new listings of eq-
uity at NYSE from Warshow (1924, p. 27), thus an underestimation of total
equity issuance. From 1906q1 to 1918q4: Corporate Issues, Stocks, Including
Refunds, U.S., Canadian, and Foreign from the NBER Macrohistory database,
available at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/M10029M144NNBR. The
data description leads one to believe this must be an overestimate of the ac-
tual equity issuance activity. The data is however consistent with the annual
series reported from 1910 in Carter et al. (2006, series Cj837) which is why
I assume its accuracy. From 1919q1 to 1926q3: New securities issues, for
new capital, domestic, preferred and common reported by Board of Governors
(1943, p. 487). From 1926q4 to 2008q1: Baker & Wurgler (2000), updated
in September 2008. From 2008q2: Financial and non-financial stock issues,
U.S. corporations reported by the Federal Reserve in Table 1.46, available at
https://www.federalreserve.gov/data/corpsecure/current.htm.
Debt Issuance From 1900q1 to 1926q3: U.S. bond offerings, par value, all industries
reported by Hickman (1953, pp. 324–325, appendix A, table A-15).
Available under code m10071 at https://www.nber.org/research/data/
nber-macrohistory-x-savings-and-investment. From 1926q4 to 2008q1:
Baker & Wurgler (2000), updated in September 2008. From 2008q2: bonds,
sold in the United States, U.S. corporations reported by the Federal Re-
serve in Table 1.46, available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/data/
corpsecure/current.htm.
High yield share From 1908q1 to 1943q4: Annual averages computed from Hickman (1958,
p. 179, Table 34, classes X and above) used as quarterly averages and then
four-quarter moving average applied for smoothing. From 1944q1 to 1982q4:
Annual averages from Greenwood & Hanson (2013), method as before. From
1983q1 to 2015q4: Quarterly averages from Greenwood & Hanson (2013),
smoothing as before. From 2016q1 to 2018q2: Quarterly averages from
https://www.hbs.edu/behavioral-finance-and-financial-stability/
data/Pages/sentiment.aspx, smoothing as before.
Recession Quarter of business cycle peak based on NBER dating methodology. Source:
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/USREC.
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